Access to the Control Plane console or CLI is granted by authenticating using single sign-on (SSO) to one of the following providers:
For your chosen provider, Multi-Factor Authentication (MFA) is recommended.
Access to the Control Plane CLI using a Service Account is granted by the use of a generated token.
During the token generation, the token can be copied to the clipboard or downloaded. After the token modal is
dismissed, the token will no longer be available to be displayed or retrieved and will need to be regenerated
if lost or compromised.
Authorization to all Control Plane resources is controlled using fine-grained authorization policies assigned to
the following principal types:
All communications from external sources use end-to-end TLS to the destination Workloads.
The server certificates are generated by Let’s Encrypt and are rotated every 60 days.
All internal communications use mutual TLS (mTLS) using client certificates.
These certificates are rotated every hour.
Control Plane uses industry-standard firewall technology. All Workloads are configured to be fully
restricted with no internal or external communication enabled by default, except for internal health check
Inbound access to a Workload can be enabled/disabled from the entire Internet or
limited to a specific list of CIDRs.
Outbound access from a Workload can be enabled/disabled to the entire Internet or
limited to a specific list of CIDRs or hostnames.
By default, the Workload’s internal firewall is disabled.
Each Workload can be configured to allow inbound communications from:
Workloads in the same GVC
Workloads in the same Org
Allow to access itself (enable replicas of a Workload to access other replicas)
Network Resource Access
Network resource access via agents (configured within a Workload Identity) is
implicitly allowed through the firewall.
The internal Kubernetes API access is restricted from all Workloads by multiple firewall levels.
No Kubernetes access tokens are available to the Workloads.
Access to kernel system calls is filtered using gVisor which provides an isolation boundary between the
application and the host kernel.
Workloads can communicate with:
The Control Plane metadata service which provides short-lived cloud credentials based on the
identity of the Workload.
The Control Plane audit service.
Every Workload receives discovery information for other Workloads across the Org but communication is disabled by default using
firewalls and client certificate validation.
All Workloads are isolated at the Org level based on the use of:
Direct communications between containers residing in other Orgs are not possible. Isolation between Workloads
within an Org is defined based on the Workloads' internal firewall configuration.
Containers are isolated by the use of:
Restricted Capabilities (groups of syscalls)
The following headers are sanitized and replaced with valid content before being forwarded to running Workloads:
Used to verify the source address of the external requestee.
Used to verify that communications between Workloads were made using mTLS and to verify the identity of the
Identity Cloud Access
Leverages AWS roles and policies to create least privileged, short-lived tokens that are assigned to Workloads
Network traffic between Control Plane and the AWS API is over a TLS connection.
During the creation of a Cloud Account targeting AWS, a policy within an AWS account is created that allows
the Control Plane AWS account the ability to perform the following actions:
Leverages Azure Function Apps to create least privileged, short-lived tokens that are assigned to
Workloads during startup.
Network traffic between Control Plane and the Azure Function App endpoint is over a TLS connection
and the request body is signed and encrypted using JOSE (https://jose.readthedocs.io/en/latest/).
The Function App is assigned the owner role within the Azure subscription. Users with permissions to
create/update Workloads identities have the ability to assign any scope and roles within the subscription.
Leverages GCP Service Accounts to create least privileged, short-lived tokens that are assigned to Workloads
Network traffic between Control Plane and the GCP API is over a TLS connection.
During the creation of a Cloud Account targeting GCP, the Control Plane GCP Service Account is added to a
project and granted the following roles:
Service Account Admin
Service Account Token Creator
Log Access and Retention Policy
All logs generated by an Org are only accessible by a user having the readLogspermission.
Logs are retained for 60 days.
Org secrets are encrypted at rest using envelope encryption and use TLS while in transit. Secrets are
stored on multiple cloud providers using cloud-based Hardware Security Modules (HSM).
Security updates and patches are applied regularly and meet all compliance and regulation requirements.
For zero-day vulnerabilities, updates are applied as soon as they are available and verified.
All scheduled maintenance that could cause downtime will be communicated via email and Discord.